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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent,: 
-v- Case No. 18975 
THOMAS LOWELL SPRAGUE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was chared by information with 
distribution of a controlled substance for value under Utah 
Code 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (1982). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury and foun<'I guilty 
of distribution of a controlled substance for value on 
December 6, 1982 in the Sixth Judicial District Court in and 
for Sanpete County, State of Utah, the Honorable Don v. Tibbs, 
presiding. On January 5, 1983, appellant was sentenced to a 
suspended, indeterminate term of imprisonment not to exceed 
five years and a suspended fine of $4,000. Appellant was 
fined $1,000 and placed in the county jail for a period of 
ninety days reviewable after thirty days in light of 
appellant's progress. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court af firmin0 
the verdict and judgment of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Deputy James Tauffer of the Sanpete County Sheriff's 
Department was working as an undercover agent when he 
initiated contact with appellant on August 19, 1982 at 10 p.m. 
in a parking lot across from the Manti temple in Manti, Utah 
(T. 64-67). Tauffer and appellant conversed between their 
pickup trucks for a while before Tauffer asked appellant if he 
knew where Tauffer could purchase one quarter ounce of 
marijuana (T. 67). Appellant replied "at that time he didn't 
and that our best bet would be in Provo, that it was pretty 
dry down here at that time, and at this time he [appellant] 
gave me his name and his number and told me [Tauf fer] that I 
could call him back later." (T.67). 
No phone contacts occurred before Tauffer's second 
meeting with appellant on August 27, 1983 at appellant's place 
of work, Mr. Chainsaw in Manti, Utah ( T. 68). When Tauffer 
again expressed an interest in the purchase of a quarter ounce 
of marijuana, appellant said that he was going to Gunnison and 
might fina some (T. 69). Tauffer asked where they could meet 
and appellant suggested that he would find Tauffer later that 
evening in Ephraim (T. 69). Tauffer waited for appellant on 
August 27 in Ephraim, but appellant never appeared (T. 69). 
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A third contact occurred on August 31, 1982, as 
Deputy Tauffer encountered appellant at the Bright Spot 
restaurant in Manti (T. 69). Tauffer asked why appellant had 
missed their second meeting. Appellant replied that he could 
not find any marijuana in Gunnison hut asked if Tauffer was 
then interested in purchasing a gram of marijuana (T. 69-70). 
Tauffer asked about the price and appellant said, "$10.00 a 
gram." (T. 70). Tauffer requested to see the marijuana before 
his purchase (T. 70). Appellant replied that he would have to 
go get it and left while Tauffer waited at the Brite Spot (T. 
70). 
Appellant returned "a little bit later" (T. 70) and 
brought Tauffer out to the parking lot ( T. 70). Appellant 
showed Tauffer the marijuana, introduced him to a friend in 
appellant's car, and took the ten dollars from Tauffer. 
Appellant testified that he had gone to the home of 
Clark Johnson, returned with Johnson to the Bright Spot and 
later that evening gave Johnson the ten dollars (T. 108-110). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT WAS NOT ENTRAPPED BY THE 
UNDERCOVER POLICE 
Appellant claims as a positive nefense that he was 
entrapped, Utah Code Ann.§ 76-2-303 (1982), into distributin') 
a controlled substance for value unner Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii). Appellant's motion to dismiss on the 
basis of entrapment ( T. 91) was nenied ( T. 95). Al though a 
jury instruction on entrapment was given (#15, R.54), 
appellant was found guilty of distribution of a controlled 
substance for value (R. 61). 
Entrapment is recognized as a defense in Utah Code 
Ann.§ 76-2-303(1) (1953), as amended: 
It is a defense that the actor was 
entrapped into committing the offense. 
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement 
officer or a person directed by or acting 
in co-operation with the officer induces 
the commission for prosecution by methods 
creating a substantial risk that the 
offense would be committed by one not 
otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct 
merely affording a person an opportunity 
to commit on offense does not constitute 
entrapment 
Utah had traditionally adopted the subjective test of 
entrapment as exemplified in State v. Pacheco, 13 Utah 2d 148, 
369 P.2d 494, 496 (1962). The subjective test asked (1) 
whether there was an inducement and (2) if so, whether the 
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defenclant showecl any predisposition to commit the offense.l 
Although Pacheco, supra was construed initially as consistent 
with the passage in 1973 of§ 76-2-303(1),2 this Court later 
recognizecl that the explicit wording of§ 76-2-303(1) 
incorporates the objective standard of entrapment. State v. 
Taylor, Utah, 599 P.2d 496 (1979). 
The objective test focuses not on the predisposition 
of the defendant, but "on whether the police conduct revealed 
in the particular case falls below standards, to which common 
feelings respond, for the proper use of governmental power." 
Id. at 500. The test to determine an unlawful entrapment 
examines whether the officer "induced the defendant to commit 
such an offense by persuasion or inducement which woulcl be 
effective to persuade an average person, other than one who 
was merely given the opportunity to commit the offenses." Id. 
at 503. Examples of prohibited police conduct are "extreme 
pleas of desperate illness or appeals based primarily on 
sympathy, pity or close personal friendship or offers of 
inordinate sums of money." Taylor, at 503; Grossman v. 
State, 457 P.2d 226-230 (AK. 1969). 
1 The subjective test is adopted in Sorrells v. U.S., 287 
u.s. 435, 53 s.ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932); see generally: 
62 A.LR. 3d 110, Anno.: Modern Status of the Law Concerning 
Entrapment to Commit Narcotics Offense -- State Cases, § 2(a), 
p. 114. 
2 State v. Curtis, Utah, 542 P.2d 744, 746 (1975). 
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Appellant was not entrapped but merely afforded an 
opportunity to commit the charged offense. Office Tauffer ha4 
met appellant three times. Their relationshir of casual 
friendship, was not analogous to the emotion al at tachrnent u'""d 
by the girlfriend police aqent in Taylor (girlfriPnd was 
former lover, a cohabitant with the defendant and pleaded with 
the ex-addict defendant to help her avoid withdrawal pains). 
Each of the first two encounters between appellant and Tauf fer 
errled with appellant expressing knowledge of available 
supplies in the area and making tentative promises to secure 
marijuana in contrast with the unencouraged and repeated phone 
followups by the police agent in State v. Kourbelas, Utah, 621 
P.2d 1238 (1980). Officer Tauffer's three contacts were 
merely conscientious, police work follow-ups based on a 
contact. 
At no time did appellant refuse to be involved in 
the sale of marijuana to Tauffer. The practicalities of 
police undercover investigations require that the officer make 
at least sufficient effort to earn the confidence of a wary 
seller. The line that distinguishes gaining the confidence of 
a wary seller from creating such confidence as to constitute 
an inducement or entrapment cannot be quantified by the number 
of contacts or magical words that are exchangen between one 
party and another. Instead, an examination of the quality of 
contacts occurring in a given situation will disclose "whether 
the police conduct revealed in the particular case falls below 
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standards, to which common feelings respond, for the proper 
use of government power. Taylor at 500. Appellant initiated 
the offer of a current sale during the meeting at the Brite 
Spot cafe. (T. 69-70). Therefore, Tauffer's effort in 
contacting appellant did not create a "substantial risk that 
the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to 
commit it." Utah Code Ann., E> 76-2-303(1) (1982). 
State v. Ontiveros, No. 19021 (Filed November 9, 
1983) reversed a conviction of defendant under Utah Code Ann. 
58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) (1982) commenting that defendant should 
have been charged not with distributing a controlled substance 
for value but with arranging for the distribution of a 
controlled substance for value, Utah Code Ann. i;; 
58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) (1982). Ontiveros at 3. Although the facts 
of this case are similar, appellant here returned with the 
marijuana and gave it to the officer and received payment. In 
Ontiveros, the defendant received money from the officer, then 
left to procure the marijuana from an assumed third party and 
then returned to give the marijuana to the officer. In the 
instant case, however, at no time did Tauffer see appellant 
give the money to a third party nor did appellant ever 
represent to Tauf fer that the payment was for a third party. 
Although the defendant in Ontiveros claimed 
insufficiency of the evidence, appellant does not argue on 
appeal either the insufficiency of the evidence or the 
provisions under which he was charged. A theory not presented 
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on appeal will re regarded as having heen ahanclonecl. Gunnar 
v. Brice, 17 Wash. App. 819, 565 P.2d 1212, 1214 (1977); 
Hojem v. Kelley, 21 Wash. App. 200, 584 P.2rl 4'il, 4'i4 n.1 
(1978) 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE 
THAT DEFENDANT HAD BEEN CHARGED WITH A 
SUBSEQUENT DRUG OFFENSE. 
Appellant contends that the trial court improperly 
admitted evidence of a subsequent charge for the sale of 
mushrooms to Ed Spann, an undercover agent present at officer 
Tauffer's first meeting with the appellant. Appellant's 
counsel objected at trial that the cross-examination of 
appellant on the subsequent charge was irrelevant to 
appellant's defense of entrapment (T. 113-114). On the 
contrary, the trial court properly allowed such 
cross-examination under Ut. R. Evia. 55 (1983) as evidence of 
a prior criminal act to prove a material fact, i.e. appellant 
intended to keep for his own value the SlO given him by Deputy 
Tauffer. 
Rule 55 provides that: 
Subject to Rule 47 evidence that a person 
committed a crime or civil wrong on a 
specified occasion, is inadmissible to 
prove his disposition to commit crime or 
civil wrong as the basis for an inference 
that he committed another crime or civil 
wrong on another specified occassion but, 
subject to Rule 45 and 48, such evidence 
is admissible when relevant to prove some 
other material fact including abscence of 
mistake or accident, motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowlege or 
identity. 
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involves the prosecutor's cross-examination of appellant (T. 
110-113). Appellant claimed that after having delivered the 
gram of marijuana to Deputy Tauffer, he got back in the car 
with Clark Johnson and gave Johnson the $10.00 (T.110-111). 
The prosecutor next asked appellant, "Now, is that something, 
Mr. Sprague, that you do often is sell marijuana for your 
friends? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Tauffer. 
Q. 
violation? 
A. 
Q. 
violation? 
A. 
Q. 
No. 
Have You ever done it before? 
No 
Have you even been charged with a similar 
Never 
Never have been charged with a similar 
No. 
Have you ever been charged with any kind of drug 
offense in Utah County? 
A. No. 
Q. Never? 
A. No. 
(T.111). After a conference outside the presence of the jury, 
objection by appellant's counsel was overruled. The 
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prosecutor continued his line of questioning to explore 
whether appellant was selling the drug: 
Q. Now, I think if I understood you 
correctly a moment ago you said you have 
never sold any drugs other than this one 
time for which we're here today. Would 
you care to give us some explanation to 
the Utah County charge? 
A. What I mean is I don't sell for a 
profit or anything like that. I don't get 
mixed in with money deals or anything. 
(T. 114). Appellant's answer reflects this interpretion of 
the prosecutor's questions about the subsequent sales. The 
questions explore evidence of criminal drug sale to show 
appellant's intent to keep the $10.00 given him by the Deputy 
Tauffer in exchange for the marijuana. 
In State v. Tanner, No. (Utah November 15, 
1983) this Court reaffirmed the admissability under Rule 55 of 
"evidence of other crimes or civil [wrong] that is competent 
and relevant to prove some material fact, other to show merely 
the general disposition of the defendant." Id. at 9. In the 
instant case, the prosecutor's "other crime" inquires were 
relevant in proving appellant's intent to keep the ten dollars 
given to him by Officer Tauffer, a material fact of the 
charged offense of Distribution of a Controlled Substance for 
value. 
Appellant correctly argues that such evidence was 
irrelevant to rebut the defense of entrapment. However, the 
questions were relevant to prove a material fact of intent to 
-10-
distribute a controlled substance for value under Utah Code 
Ann.<;; 58-37-B(l)(a)(ii) (1983). Ut. R. Evid. 55 (1983). 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant was not entrapped into distributing a 
controlled substance for value. Officer Tauffer initiated two 
casual contacts with appellant. On the third contact 
appellant offered to sell Tauffer a gram of marijuana. 
Officer Tauffer's efforts in no way badgered, pleaaed or 
manipulated appellant to such an extent that appellant was 
entrappea via the "objective stanctard" of entrapment. 
The trial court properly admitted evidence disclosed 
through cross-examination of appellant. The fact that 
appellant had been charged with a subsequent drug offense was 
relevant under Ut. R. Evia. S'i to estabish appellant's intent 
to keep the ten dollar payment received from Officer Tauffer 
in exhange for the gram of marijuana. 
This Court should affirm appellant's conviction of 
distributing a controlled substance for value. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this (.,+{...day of January, 
19 84. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON, 
General 
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